ε-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games

被引：5

作者：

Lehrer, E ^{[1
]}

Sorin, S

机构：

[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Sackler Fac Exact Sci, Sch Math Sci, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

[2] Ecole Polytech, Lab Econometr, F-75005 Paris, France

[3] Univ Paris 10, UFR SEGMI, MODALX, F-92001 Nanterre, France

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1998年 / 27卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/s001820050069

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We introduce the concept of epsilon-consistent equilibrium where each player plays a epsilon-best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an epsilon-consistent equilibrium induces an epsilon-equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of epsilon-consistent equilibrium is examined in various repeated games. The main result is the existence in stochastic games with absorbing states.

引用

页码：231 / 244

页数：14

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