Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring

被引：5
|
作者：
Chan, Jimmy [1 ]
Zhang, Wenzhang [2 ]
机构：
[1] Fudan Univ, Sch Econ, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2015年 / 157卷
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
Collusion; Oligopoly; Repeated game; Private information; Private monitoring; REPEATED GAMES; REPEATED AUCTIONS; FOLK THEOREM; COMMUNICATION; EFFICIENCY; MECHANISM; INCENTIVES; CARTELS; SIGNALS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.004
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, nor sales may still enforce a collusive agreement by tying each firm's continuation profit to the truncated current profits of the other firms. The mechanism applies to both price and quantity competition, and the main features are broadly consistent with common cartel practice identified by Harrington and Skrzypacz [24]. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：188 / 211
页数：24
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