Deliberation, Technical Deliberation and Good Deliberation in Aristotelian Ethics

This paper faces the problem of how to determinate the framework in which, according to Aristotle, the deliberation and his results can be assessed: the decision and the consequent action. The problem emerges mainly because of what Aristotle calls "indetermination of deliberation," since, in situations whose options about what to deliberate are blurred, it is difficult to determinate which is the framework that can be used to determinate if the decision resulting from the deliberation is accurate or not. To face this problem, in the first place, we distinguish between technical and moral deliberation. The distinction is framed in terms of the ends because in technical deliberation the end is extrinsic to the action itself, and for this reason it is possible to offer different assessments of the actions achieved. In moral deliberation, the ends are only intrinsic to the action, and they are determined only in behalf of their connection with good deliberation. So, it is only possible to establish an adequate normative framework to assess each deliberation based upon a "good deliberation model", established by practical wisdom, and extended also for the community from which the subject takes part.