Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations

被引：0
|
作者：
Kawamori, Tomohiko [1 ]
Miyakawa, Toshiji [2 ]
机构：
[1] Meijo Univ, Fac Econ, Nagoya, Aichi, Japan
[2] Osaka Univ Econ, Fac Econ, Higashiyodogawa Ku, 2-2-8 Osumi, Osaka 5338533, Japan
来源：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS | 2017年 / 45卷 / 05期
关键词：
Efficiency; Noncooperative coalitional bargaining; Externalities; Renegotiations; Nash bargaining solution; Bargaining-blocking-proofness;
D O I：
10.1016/j.orl.2017.06.007
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
We consider a noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with externalities and renegotiations. We provide the necessary and sufficient condition for an efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium to exist. This condition states that a Nash bargaining solution is immune to any blocking. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：427 / 430
页数：4
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