Administrative Enforcement of Insider Trading in China: An Empirical Study

This article examines insider trading administrative enforcement by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) between 1999 and 2019. It first conducts an empirical study of 318 cases by analysing six dimensions: (1) the general trend; (2) the scope of insider information; (3) the identity of insiders; (4) the categories of insiders' behaviour; (5) the punishment relevant to insider trading; and (6) the forms and procedures revealed in the CSRC's decisions. The article then explores the extent to which the revised 2019 Securities Law has rectified defects in the previous provisions, and what the first two decades of experience reveal about the challenges associated with insider trading and the administrative enforcement of it in China. The number of administrative enforcement cases and the intensity of penalties imposed by the CSRC have shown a significant upward trend. However, enforcement action against insider trading continues to suffer from a relative lack of resources.