From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non-binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a strike'. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book-to-market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non-strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.
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Univ Manchester, Manchester Business Sch, MBS Crawford, Manchester M15 6PB, Lancs, EnglandUniv Manchester, Manchester Business Sch, MBS Crawford, Manchester M15 6PB, Lancs, England
Voulgaris, Georgios
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Stathopoulos, Konstantinos
Walker, Martin
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Univ Manchester, Manchester Business Sch, MBS Crawford, Manchester M15 6PB, Lancs, EnglandUniv Manchester, Manchester Business Sch, MBS Crawford, Manchester M15 6PB, Lancs, England
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Reichman Univ, Arison Sch Business, IL-4610101 Herzliyya, Israel
Cornell Univ, Johnson Grad Sch Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
ECGI, Brussels, BelgiumReichman Univ, Arison Sch Business, IL-4610101 Herzliyya, Israel
Grinstein, Yaniv
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Lauterbach, Beni
Yosef, Revital
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Bar Ilan Univ, Sch Business Adm, IL-5290002 Ramat Gan, IsraelReichman Univ, Arison Sch Business, IL-4610101 Herzliyya, Israel