Tax aggressiveness in private family firms: An agency perspective

被引:60
|
作者
Steijvers, Tensie [1 ]
Niskanen, Mervi [2 ]
机构
[1] Hasselt Univ, KIZOK Res Ctr, Agoralaan Bldg D, B-3590 Diepenbeek, Belgium
[2] Univ Eastern Finland, Sch Business, Kuopio, Finland
关键词
Tax aggressiveness; Family firms; CEO ownership; Board of directors; SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; BOARD CHARACTERISTICS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CASH HOLDINGS; OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE; DIRECTORS; ALTRUISM;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfbs.2014.06.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article investigates, from an agency perspective, whether private family firms, compared to private nonfamily firms, are more tax aggressive. Moreover, for private family firms, the effect of the extent of separation between ownership and management on tax aggressiveness is studied. Additionally, we verify whether effective board monitoring moderates this relationship. Using Finnish survey data, results show that private family firms are less tax aggressive than nonfamily firms. For the subsample of private family firms, firms with a lower CEO ownership share are more tax aggressive whereas the presence of an outside director in their board mitigates this direct effect. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:347 / 357
页数:11
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] Differences in tax aggressiveness between family and non-family companies
    Monterrey Mayoral, Juan
    Sanchez Segura, Amparo
    REVISTA ESPANOLA DE FINANCIACION Y CONTABILIDAD-SPANISH JOURNAL OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING, 2010, 39 (145): : 65 - 97
  • [42] The Deterrent Effect of Employee Whistleblowing on Firms' Financial Misreporting and Tax Aggressiveness
    Wilde, Jaron H.
    ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2017, 92 (05): : 247 - 280
  • [43] The effect of intrafamily agency conflicts on audit demand in private family firms: The moderating role of the board of directors
    Corten, Maarten
    Steijvers, Tensie
    Lybaert, Nadine
    JOURNAL OF FAMILY BUSINESS STRATEGY, 2017, 8 (01) : 13 - 28
  • [44] Conflicting Selves: Family Owners' Multiple Goals and Self-Control Agency Problems in Private Firms
    De Massis, Alfredo
    Kotlar, Josip
    Mazzola, Pietro
    Minola, Tommaso
    Sciascia, Salvatore
    ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, 2018, 42 (03) : 362 - 389
  • [45] AN AGENCY PERSPECTIVE OF THE FIRMS LIFE-CYCLE
    BULMASH, S
    MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, 1986, 7 (02) : 107 - 111
  • [46] TAX AVOIDANCE, PRIVATE COMPANIES AND THE FAMILY
    Loutzenhiser, Glen
    CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL, 2013, 72 (01): : 35 - 49
  • [47] Involuntary political connections and private firms' tax avoidance
    Xiang, Junyi
    Zhang, Hongxiang
    Dang, Dingyu
    Guan, Jing
    PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL, 2023, 79
  • [48] Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms
    Schulze, WS
    Lubatkin, MH
    Dino, RN
    JOURNAL OF BUSINESS VENTURING, 2003, 18 (04) : 473 - 490
  • [49] Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence
    Schulze, WS
    Lubatkin, MH
    Dino, RN
    Buchholtz, AK
    ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, 2001, 12 (02) : 99 - 116
  • [50] Dividends and family governance practices in private family firms
    Anneleen Michiels
    Wim Voordeckers
    Nadine Lybaert
    Tensie Steijvers
    Small Business Economics, 2015, 44 : 299 - 314