Dynamic Contract Incentive Mechanism for Cooperative Wireless Networks

被引:81
|
作者
Zhao, Nan [1 ]
Liang, Ying-Chang [2 ]
Pei, Yiyang [3 ]
机构
[1] Hubei Univ Technol, Hubei Collaborat Innovat Ctr High Efficient Utili, Wuhan 430068, Hubei, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Elect Sci & Technol China, Ctr Intelligent Networking & Commun, Chengdu 611731, Sichuan, Peoples R China
[3] Singapore Inst Technol, Singapore 138683, Singapore
基金
中国国家自然科学基金; 中国博士后科学基金;
关键词
Cooperative communication; asymmetric information; long-term incentive mechanism; dynamic contract design; USER COOPERATION; RELAY-SELECTION; GAME; DESIGN; ALLOCATION; DIVERSITY; ACCESS;
D O I
10.1109/TVT.2018.2865951
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Cooperative communication is a promising technique to mitigate channel impairment and improve spectral efficiency. Due to the mobility of relay nodes (RNs) and the unfavourable effects of wireless channels, channel conditions may change as time passes. Therefore, how to design proper long-term incentive mechanisms for RNs in such dynamic communication environments is an essential issue. This paper investigates the contract incentive method under asymmetric information scenario, where the relay channel condition and cost are the RNs' private information. To capture the dynamic characteristic of the RNs' cooperative information during the long-term cooperation, two dynamic contract mechanisms are introduced into long-term relay incentive with different RNs' relay information structures. The optimal contract is derived to maximize the source's expected utility for both independent asymmetric information and correlated asymmetric information. Numerical results are presented to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic contract-based incentive mechanism.
引用
收藏
页码:10970 / 10982
页数:13
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