Credit default swaps;
Credit risk;
CEO turnover;
CEO legacy;
Powerful CEO;
DETERMINANTS;
SUCCESSION;
EARNINGS;
MANAGERS;
SPREADS;
IMPACT;
MODEL;
D O I:
10.1016/j.qref.2020.10.008
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
In this study, we examine how changes in credit risk around CEO turnover announcements are affected by the nature of the succession (forced vs. voluntary), outgoing CEO's legacy, and concentration of job titles. We find that firms whose incumbent is forced out experience a greater increase in credit default swap (CDS) spreads than firms with voluntary departures, especially when the influence of the outgoing CEO lingers or the CEO is powerful. These results provide new insights into sources of uncertainty around CEO turnovers and extend the literature on the determinants of CDS spreads around this corporate event. (C) 2020 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机构:
Renmin Univ China, China Financial Policy Res Ctr, Beijing, Haidian, Peoples R China
Renmin Univ China, Sch Finance, Beijing, Haidian, Peoples R ChinaRenmin Univ China, China Financial Policy Res Ctr, Beijing, Haidian, Peoples R China
He, Qing
Li, Dongxu
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Xiamen Univ, Sch Econ, Xiamen, Fujian, Peoples R China
Xiamen Univ, WangYanan Inst Studies Econ, Xiamen, Fujian, Peoples R China
Xiamen Univ, MOE Key Lab Econometr, Xiamen, Fujian, Peoples R ChinaRenmin Univ China, China Financial Policy Res Ctr, Beijing, Haidian, Peoples R China