We conduct a field experiment paying students according to relative performance on a mathematics exam and tracking study efforts on a mathematics website to test the incentive effects of affirmative action (AA) policies on study effort and math proficiency. AA increases study effort and exam performance for the majority of disadvantaged students targeted by the policy. While the performance of the highest-ability students targeted by the AA policy declines, on average study activity and exam performance rise under AA. Overall, the experimental evidence suggests that AA can promote greater equality of market outcomes while narrowing achievement gaps.
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Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Econ, Irvine, CA 92717 USAUniv Calif Irvine, Dept Econ, Irvine, CA 92717 USA
Bookwala, Kamal
Gallemore, Caleb
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Lafayette Coll, Dept Int Affairs, Easton, PA 18042 USAUniv Calif Irvine, Dept Econ, Irvine, CA 92717 USA
Gallemore, Caleb
Gomez-Minambres, Joaquin
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Lafayette Coll, Dept Econ, 730 High St, Easton, PA 18042 USA
Chapman Univ, Econ Sci Inst, One Univ Dr, Orange, CA 92866 USAUniv Calif Irvine, Dept Econ, Irvine, CA 92717 USA
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Univ Parma, Dept Law Polit & Int Studies, Via Univ 12, I-43121 Parma, ItalyUniv Parma, Dept Law Polit & Int Studies, Via Univ 12, I-43121 Parma, Italy
Degli Antoni, Giacomo
Grimalda, Gianluca
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Kiel Inst World Econ, Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel, GermanyUniv Parma, Dept Law Polit & Int Studies, Via Univ 12, I-43121 Parma, Italy