The social costs and benefits of too-big-to-fail banks: A "bounding" exercise

被引:14
|
作者
Boyd, John H. [1 ]
Heitz, Amanda [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Minnesota, Carlson Sch Management, Dept Finance, 321 19th Ave S, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
[2] Tulane Univ, AB Freeman Sch Business, Dept Finance, Goldring Woldenberg Hall 2,7 McAlister Dr, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
关键词
Financial crisis; Financial intermediation; Banking; SCALE ECONOMIES; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.03.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
While the policy of too-big-to-fail has received wide attention in the literature, there is little agreement regarding economies of scale for financial firms. We take the stand that systemic risk increases when the larger players in the financial sector have a larger share of output. Calculations indicate that the cost to the macro-economy due to increased systemic risk is always much larger than the potential benefit due to scale economies. When distributional and intergenerational issues are considered, the potential benefits to economies of scale are unlikely to ever exceed the potential costs due to increased risk of a banking crisis. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:251 / 265
页数:15
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