CDS, CEO compensation, and firm value

被引：1
|
作者：
Amin, Abu [1 ]
Jain, Pawan [2 ]
Upadhyay, Arun [3 ]
机构：
[1] Cent Michigan Univ, Coll Business Adm, Dept Finance & Law, 329 Sloan Hall, Mt Pleasant, MI 48859 USA
[2] West Virginia Univ, John Chambers Coll Business & Econ, Dept Finance, 234 Business & Econ Bldg, Morgantown, WV 26506 USA
[3] Florida Int Univ, Coll Business, Dept Finance, 11200 SW 8th St RB 210, Miami, FL 33199 USA
来源：
FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS | 2022年 / 46卷
关键词：
Credit default swaps; Compensation; Valuation; CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS; LOAN SALES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.frl.2021.102445
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We study the initiation effect of credit default swaps on CEOs performance-sensitive compensation and shareholder value. We find that the initiation effect of CDS contracts on CEO's delta varies by the characteristics of firms. Firms with higher R&D and intangibles reduce CEO's delta whereas firms with higher CAPX intensity increase it. Moreover, shareholder value with high CAPX intensity increases with the initiation of CDS contracts but deteriorates in firms with high R&D intensity or intangible assets. Overall, our findings support the empty creditor hypothesis and show that firms use this opportunity to alter other governance mechanisms to maximize their value.
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页数：10
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