Carnap's Theory of Descriptions and its Problems

被引:4
|
作者
Heylen, Jan [1 ]
机构
[1] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Inst Philosophy, B-3000 Louvain, Belgium
关键词
Carnap; Follesdal; Quine; Marti; Kremer; Modal Logic; Individual concept; Identity; Descriptions; Uniqueness; Collapse; Slingshot; Self-predication;
D O I
10.1007/s11225-010-9243-9
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
Carnap's theory of descriptions was restricted in two ways. First, the descriptive conditions had to be non-modal. Second, only primitive predicates or the identity predicate could be used to predicate something of the descriptum. The motivating reasons for these two restrictions that can be found in the literature will be critically discussed. Both restrictions can be relaxed, but Carnap's theory can still be blamed for not dealing adequately with improper descriptions.
引用
收藏
页码:355 / 380
页数:26
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