LIST PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION;
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES;
PERSONAL VOTE;
ELECTIONS;
PARTICIPATION;
INCENTIVES;
CURSE;
INSTITUTIONS;
CORRUPTION;
D O I:
10.1017/psrm.2015.54
中图分类号:
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号:
0302 ;
030201 ;
摘要:
I exploit the unique institutional framework of Spanish local elections, where municipalities follow different electoral systems depending on their population size, as mandated by a national law. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare turnout under closed list proportional representation and under an open list, plurality-at-large system where voters can vote for individual candidates from the same or different party-lists. I find that the open list system increases turnout by between 1 and 2 percentage points. The results suggest that open list systems, which introduce competition both across and within parties, are conducive to more voter turnout.
机构:
Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Social Sci, Madrid, Spain
Carlos III Juan March Inst, Madrid, SpainUniv Complutense Madrid, Dept Appl & Publ Econ & Polit Econ, ICEI, Madrid, Spain