Equity Vesting and Investment

被引：166
|
作者：
Edmans, Alex [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Fang, Vivian W. [4 ]
Lewellen, Katharina A. [5 ]
机构：
[1] London Business Sch, Regents Pk, London NW1 4SA, England
[2] CEPR, Washington, DC USA
[3] ECGI, Mississauga, ON, Canada
[4] Univ Minnesota, Carlson Sch Management, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
[5] Tuck Sch Business Dartmouth, Hanover, NH USA
来源：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2017年 / 30卷 / 07期
基金：
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词：
MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; CAPITAL-MARKETS; COMPENSATION; CONTRACTS; MODEL; FRAUD; FIRMS; REAL; LINK;
D O I：
10.1093/rfs/hhx018
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This paper links the CEO's concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. We identify short-term concerns using the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in a given quarter. Vesting equity is associated with a decline in the growth of research and development and capital expenditure, positive analyst forecast revisions, and positive earnings guidance, within the same quarter. More broadly, by introducing a measure of incentives that is determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by current investment opportunities, we provide evidence that CEO contracts affect real decisions.
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页码：2229 / 2271
页数：43
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