corruption;
incentives;
development;
separation of powers;
D O I:
10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00127-9
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
We model separation of powers as an instrument against corruption, more specifically as a way to decrease the costs of collusion-proofness. Then, we show that the value of this institutional design is higher in developing countries. Unfortunately, the same reasons which are behind this higher value also increase the implementation cost of this "institution". (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D7; H5; O12.
机构:
Harvard Law Sch, Petrie Flom Ctr Hlth Law Policy Biotechnol & Biot, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAHarvard Law Sch, Petrie Flom Ctr Hlth Law Policy Biotechnol & Biot, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA