Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Green Advertising in the Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Monopoly or Competitive Market

Customers feel a degree of ambiguity associated with low-carbon products, such as remanufactured products, and undervalue them. Although green advertising significantly impacts consumers' acceptance of remanufactured products and the low-carbon supply chain (LCSC), limited research has been carried out on advertisement decisions for remanufactured products in the LCSC. This study introduces a two-echelon remanufacturing supply chain motivated by the practice of applying green advertising to update consumers' low-carbon awareness. We use a game-theoretical approach to analyze the remanufacturer's and retailer's decisions on the green advertising program (non-coop vs. co-op green advertising) under different competitive scenarios in the LCSC. We find that the LCSC's and the retailer's profits are optimal in the non-coop green advertising under the monopoly, but the LCSC's and the remanufacturer's profits are optimal in the co-op green advertising under the competition. We suggest that the entry and royalty fees can be applied to coordinate the LCSC under different competitive scenarios.