A MODEL OF DELIBERATIVE AND AGGREGATIVE DEMOCRACY

被引：17
|
作者：
Perote-Pena, Juan [1 ]
Piggins, Ashley [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Zaragoza, Dept Anal Econ, Zaragoza 50005, Spain
[2] Natl Univ Ireland Galway, JE Cairnes Sch Business & Econ, Galway, Ireland
[3] Natl Univ Ireland Galway, Whitaker Inst, Galway, Ireland
来源：
ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY | 2015年 / 31卷 / 01期
关键词：
Deliberation; aggregation; social choice theory; SOCIAL CHOICE; IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT; JUDGMENTS;
D O I：
10.1017/S0266267114000418
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We present a model of collective decision making in which aggregation and deliberation are treated simultaneously. Individuals debate in a public forum and potentially revise their judgements in light of deliberation. Once this process is exhausted, a rule is applied to aggregate post-deliberation judgements in order to make a social choice. Restricting attention to three alternatives, we identify conditions under which a democracy is truth-revealing'. This condition says that the deliberation path and the aggregation rule always lead to the correct social choice being made, irrespective of both the original profile of judgements and the size of the electorate.
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页码：93 / 121
页数：29
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