Do Political Connections Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from a Developing Country

被引:58
|
作者
Saeed, Abubakr [1 ]
Belghitar, Yacine [2 ]
Clark, Ephraim [3 ]
机构
[1] COMSATS Inst Informat Technol, Dept Management Sci, Pk Rd, Islamabad 44000, Pakistan
[2] Cranfield Univ, Cranfield Sch Management, Bedford, England
[3] Middlesex Univ, Dept Accounting & Finance, Hendon, England
关键词
firm performance; political connections; political environment; growth opportunities; developing country; INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET; COMPENSATION POLICIES; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; PRIVATIZED FIRMS; LISTED COMPANIES; OWNERSHIP; SURVIVAL; DIVIDEND; GERMANY; MATTER;
D O I
10.1080/1540496X.2015.1041845
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate how politicians serving on the boards of directors influence firm performance. The results show a negative relationship between political connections and firm performance. Specifically, politically connected firms underperform nonconnected firms directors by almost 17 percent and 15 percent based on return on assets and return on equity, respectively. By stratifying the sample duration into two periods based on the political environment, we find that this effect is more pronounced in autocratic as opposed to democratic regimes. Finally, our results also suggest that the performance of connected firms with more growth opportunities is not affected by political connections.
引用
收藏
页码:1876 / 1891
页数:16
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