Democratic accountability and central bank independence: A reply to various critics

被引：3

作者：

Elgie, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Nottingham, Sch Polit, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1080/01402380108425425

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：217 / 221

页数：5

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