This paper investigates the use of equity compensation for independent directors, with a focus on the impact of large shareholders on a company's tendency to use equity compensation to align independent directors' interests with those of shareholders. Based on data from 215 large Australian listed companies from 20052009, our analyses show that the use of equity incentive pay for independent directors is more likely when the aggregate ownership percentage of large shareholders is moderate, when there are multiple large shareholders and when the ownership stakes of large shareholders are more comparable. This paper contributes to the literature by providing new evidence of how various aspects of ownership dispersion affect compensation design for independent directors.
机构:
Harvard Law Sch, Law Econ & Finance, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard Law Sch, Program Corp Governance, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAHarvard Law Sch, Law Econ & Finance, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Bebchuk, Lucian A.
Hamdani, Assaf
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Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Corp Law, Jerusalem, IsraelHarvard Law Sch, Law Econ & Finance, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
机构:
Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, David H Jacobs Chair Strateg Management, Bloomington, IN 47405 USAIndiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, David H Jacobs Chair Strateg Management, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
Daily, CM
Dalton, DR
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Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, David H Jacobs Chair Strateg Management, Bloomington, IN 47405 USAIndiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, David H Jacobs Chair Strateg Management, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA