Is accounting enforcement related to risk-taking in the banking industry?

被引：5
|
作者：
Dal Maso, Lorenzo [1 ]
Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran [2 ]
Lobo, Gerald J. [3 ]
Mazzi, Francesco [4 ]
机构：
[1] ESSEC Business Sch, 3 Ave Bernard Hirsch, F-95021 Cergy Pontoise, France
[2] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, 4700 Keele St, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
[3] Univ Houston, Bauer Coll Business, 4750 Calhoun Rd,Room 305, Houston, TX 77204 USA
[4] Univ Florence, Dept Econ & Management, Via Pandette 9,Bldg D6, I-50137 Florence, Italy
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY | 2020年 / 49卷
关键词：
Accounting Enforcement; Bank Risk-taking; Bank Complexity; Bank Reporting Discretiona; EARNINGS QUALITY; NATIONAL CULTURE; SUPERVISION; CONSEQUENCES; PERFORMANCE; STANDARDS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jfs.2020.100758
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Using a sample of banks from 36 countries, we document that accounting enforcement is negatively related to bank risk-taking. We also provide evidence that accounting enforcement enhances bank stability during the crisis. In addition, we show that banks assume less risk through more conservative lending decisions and a reduction in complexity in jurisdictions with higher accounting enforcement. Our results show that formal institutions such as accounting enforcement are associated with bank financial decisions and risk-taking behavior. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数：15
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