Do markets penalize agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders? Evidence from Chile

被引：29

作者：

Lefort, Fernando ^{[1
]}

Walker, Eduardo ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Pontificia Univ Catolica Chile, Sch Business, Santiago, Chile

来源：

DEVELOPING ECONOMIES | 2007年 / 45卷 / 03期

关键词：

agency conflicts; corporate governance; conglomerates; Chile;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1746-1049.2007.00044.x

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

Using a sample of Chilean listed firms with widespread presence of economic conglomerates that use pyramid structures to control affiliated companies, we find that firms where controlling shareholders have higher coincidence between cash and control rights are persistently more valued by the market. We carefully check that our results are not driven by omitted variable biases and control for reverse causation using a feature of Chilean Corporations Law that provides an exogenous instrument for ownership concentration.

引用

页码：283 / 314

页数：32

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