Adaptation and International Environmental Agreements

被引：17
|
作者：
Masoudi, Nahid [1 ]
Zaccour, Georges [2 ]
机构：
[1] Mem Univ Newfoundland, Dept Econ, St John, NF, Canada
[2] HEC Montreal, Chair Game Theory & Management GERAD, 3000 Cote St Catherine, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada
来源：
ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS | 2018年 / 71卷 / 01期
关键词：
International environmental agreements; Adaptation technology; Minimum participation clause; Climate change; Knowledge spillover; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; ABSORPTIVE-CAPACITY; SPILLOVERS; STRATEGIES; PROTECTION; TREATIES;
D O I：
10.1007/s10640-016-0080-9
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study the impact of collective effort in R&D in adaptation technologies, and also spillover effects on formation and size of stable international environmental agreements (IEAs). Our results suggest that it is possible to have more than one size of stable IEA. We can achieve a superior equilibrium, i.e., the grand coalition, if countries manage to keep knowledge spillovers low and arrange a minimum ratification threshold. This threshold is defined endogenously. We also shed light on the effects of two-sided spillover on global welfare and the size of stable IEAs.
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页码：1 / 21
页数：21
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