Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya
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作者:
Duflo, Esther
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MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USAMIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
Duflo, Esther
[1
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Dupas, Pascaline
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Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
CEPR, NBER, London, England
BREAD, Ghent, BelgiumMIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
Dupas, Pascaline
[2
,3
,4
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Kremer, Michael
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Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Littauer Ctr, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAMIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
Kremer, Michael
[5
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机构:
[1] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[3] CEPR, NBER, London, England
[4] BREAD, Ghent, Belgium
[5] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Littauer Ctr, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
To the extent that students benefit from high-achieving peers, tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones. However, all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to better tailor their instruction level. Lower-achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from tracking when teachers have incentives to teach to the top of the distribution. We propose a simple model nesting these effects and test its implications in a randomized tracking experiment conducted with 121 primary schools in Kenya. While the direct effect of high-achieving peers is positive, tracking benefited lower-achieving pupils indirectly by allowing teachers to teach to their level. (JEL I21, J45, O15)
机构:
Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Social Policy, London WC2A 2AE, EnglandUniv London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Social Policy, London WC2A 2AE, England
Dolan, Paul
Rudisill, Caroline
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Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Social Policy, London WC2A 2AE, EnglandUniv London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Social Policy, London WC2A 2AE, England
机构:
Univ Oxford, Oxford Univ Ctr Business Taxat, Said Business Sch, Pk End St, Oxford OX1 1HP, England
Bocconi Univ, Dondena Ctr Res Social Dynam & Publ Policy, Milan, ItalyUniv Oxford, Oxford Univ Ctr Business Taxat, Said Business Sch, Pk End St, Oxford OX1 1HP, England
Maffini, Giorgia
Xing, Jing
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Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, 1954 Huashan Rd, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R ChinaUniv Oxford, Oxford Univ Ctr Business Taxat, Said Business Sch, Pk End St, Oxford OX1 1HP, England
Xing, Jing
Devereux, Michael P.
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Univ Oxford, Oxford Univ Ctr Business Taxat, Said Business Sch, Pk End St, Oxford OX1 1HP, EnglandUniv Oxford, Oxford Univ Ctr Business Taxat, Said Business Sch, Pk End St, Oxford OX1 1HP, England