Overinvestment, ownership structure, and directors' and officers' liability insurance

被引：7
|
作者：
Chiang, Yao-Min [1 ]
Chang, Pang-Ru [2 ]
机构：
[1] Natl Taiwan Univ, Dept Finance, 1,Sec 4,Roosevelt Rd, Taipei, Taiwan
[2] Shih Chien Univ, Dept Risk Management & Insurance, 70 Da Chi St, Taipei, Taiwan
来源：
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE | 2022年 / 78卷
关键词：
Overinvestment; Ownership structure; Directors's andofficers' liability insurance; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OVER-INVESTMENT; AGENCY COSTS; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; DEMAND; UNDERINVESTMENT; ENTRENCHMENT; BEHAVIOR;
D O I：
10.1016/j.iref.2021.11.002
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This study examines the moderator effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the relationship between ownership structure and overinvestment. We find that firms with D&O insurance and higher insurance coverage have a higher probability of overinvestment. These results show the D&O insurance is like a moral hazard effect. We also find evidence that the relationship between ownership structure and overinvestment is affected by D&O insurance. As well as the results support that the firms purchasing D&O insurance is moderator effect on ownership structure and overinvestment.
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页码：38 / 50
页数：13
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