Does intellectual property right promote innovations when pirates are innovators?

被引:11
作者
Marjit, Sugata [1 ]
Yang, Lei [2 ]
机构
[1] Ctr Studies Social Sci, Kolkata, India
[2] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
Intellectual Property Rights; R&D incentive of imitators; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; DEVELOPING-COUNTRIES; PATENTS; IMITATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.iref.2014.11.023
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We identify two new channels through which Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) may affect R&D incentives that are in stark contrast to conventional wisdom. First, in a model with a simple technology we find that IPRs may deter innovations when pirates are potential innovators. Second, in a model with a complex technology we find that IPR, even in a static situation, increases consumer surplus. We show that strong IPRs lead not only to the decrease in the "competition effect", but also the increase in the "innovation effect" in the current period when there exists international specialization in R&D. When "innovation effect" dominates "competition effect", the strengthening of patent protection promotes both innovation and consumer surplus. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:203 / 207
页数:5
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