Relative CEO Underpayment and CEO Behaviour Towards R&D Spending

被引:99
作者
Fong, Eric A. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Alabama, Dept Management & Mkt, Coll Business Adm, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
关键词
CHIEF EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL REMUNERATION; JOB-SATISFACTION; AGENCY THEORY; PERFORMANCE; PAY; INCENTIVES; INNOVATION; FIRMS; TECHNOLOGY;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00861.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
P>Arguments based on labour market theory suggest that there may be CEO behavioural issues related to pay deviations from the labour market rate for CEO pay; however, few studies examine this phenomenon. This study attempts to address such behavioural issues by examining the influence of relative CEO underpayment on reductions in R&D spending, the differences in this relationship between firms in high R&D intensive versus low R&D intensive industries, and the moderating affect of ownership structure on the CEO underpayment and R&D spending relationship. Results suggest that relative CEO underpayment is associated with reductions in R&D spending in low R&D intensive industries and increases in R&D spending in high R&D intensive industries. Also, greater relative CEO underpayment leads to greater reductions in R&D spending in manager-controlled organizations as compared to owner-controlled organizations. This study provides evidence that pay deviations may, in fact, affect certain CEO behaviours, specifically relating to innovation.
引用
收藏
页码:1095 / 1122
页数:28
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