R&D Strategy And Cournot Competition With Labor-managed And Profit-maximizing Firms

被引：0
|
作者：
Luo, Jianli [1 ]
Zhong, Weijun [1 ]
机构：
[1] Southeast Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Nanjing 211189, Peoples R China
来源：
2009 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE AND FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, PROCEEDINGS | 2009年
关键词：
R&D; Strategic Interaction; Labor-managed Firm; Cournot competition; comparative static analysis; ENTREPRENEURIAL;
D O I：
10.1109/BIFE.2009.167
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
R&D strategic interaction was analyzed in two types of oligopoly: profit-maximizing firm (PMF) and labor-managed firm (LMF). By developing a two-stage game model of duopoly between PMF and LMF, we explore their production and R&D investment response curves of strategic interaction in Cournot competition. With comparative static analysis, we determined impacts of changes in their own and rival's R&D, wages, fixed costs on its optimal outputs respectively, and impacts of changes in their own and rival's R&D spillovers on optimal R&D level. Results showed there were some difference between LMF and PMF in the production and R&D investments.
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页码：718 / 721
页数：4
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