Exercise behavior, valuation, and the incentive effects of employee stock options

被引:105
|
作者
Bettis, JC
Bizjak, JM
Lemmon, ML
机构
[1] Portland State Univ, Dept Finance, Portland, OR 97207 USA
[2] Arizona State Univ, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
[3] Univ Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA
关键词
executive compensation; option exercises; employee stock options; corporate governance;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We use a large database on ESO exercises to document characteristics of exercise behavior and calibrate a utility-based model for measuring how differences in exercise behavior are manifested in option values and incentives. Option values and incentives computed from the model calibrations are compared to those computed from models used to value tradable options. Our analysis provides guidance to both academics and practitioners about how differences in exercise behavior and model choice affect measures of ESO values and incentives, and underscores the importance of gaining a thorough understanding of the underlying economic forces that affect the behavior of ESO holders. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:445 / 470
页数:26
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