Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer

被引：5
|
作者：
Osano, H [1 ]
机构：
[1] Kyoto Univ, Kyoto Inst Econ Res, Sakyo Ku, Kyoto 6068501, Japan
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1998年 / 37卷 / 02期
关键词：
renegotiation; multi-agent; implementation;
D O I：
10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00085-7
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for implementing the desired equilibrium actions in the one-principal, multi-agent model with renegotiation when each agent is allowed to make a renegotiation offer. With some belief restriction, we show that there exists a mechanism in which the second-best strategy is always implemented. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：207 / 230
页数：24
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