Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany

被引：58
作者：
Elston, JA
Goldberg, LG
机构：
[1] Univ Miami, Dept Finance, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA
[2] Univ Cent Florida, Dept Econ, Orlando, FL 32816 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2003年 / 27卷 / 07期
关键词：
executive compensation; corporate governance; Germany; agency;
D O I：
10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00274-1
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
With the growth of international mergers like DaimlerChrysler, interest in executive compensation practices abroad, particularly in Germany, has increased. Using unique data sources for Germany, we find that similar to US firms, German firms also have agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, with ownership dispersion leading to higher compensation. In addition, there is evidence that bank influence has a negative impact on compensation. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：1391 / 1410
页数：20
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