CEO personal investment decisions and firm risk

被引：19
|
作者：
Cen, Wei [1 ]
Doukas, John A. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Peking Univ, HSBC Business Sch, Shenzhen 518055, Peoples R China
[2] Old Dominion Univ, Strome Coll Business, Norfolk, VA 23529 USA
来源：
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 2017年 / 23卷 / 05期
关键词：
CEO deferred compensation; CEO risk preferences; financial crisis; firm risk; inside debt; BEHAVIORAL CONSISTENCY; COMPENSATION; INCENTIVES; VALUATION; DEBT; OVERCONFIDENCE; VOLATILITY; PRINCIPAL; MANAGERS;
D O I：
10.1111/eufm.12117
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We develop a novel method of measuring CEO risk preference based on their personal allocation of deferred compensation funds, and find CEOs holding more volatile deferred compensation portfolios lead riskier firms. We also use the 2008 financial crisis as a natural experiment to check the robustness of this new method and find consistent evidence in support of a positive association between CEO risk-taking and firm risk. Moreover, the evidence shows that risk-taking CEOs pursue risky financial and investment policies. Our results, in accord with the behavioural consistency theory, demonstrate that CEOs act consistently across personal and professional choices.
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页码：920 / 950
页数：31
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