Competing Combinatorial Auctions

被引:1
|
作者
Kittsteiner, Thomas [1 ]
Ott, Marion [2 ]
Steinberg, Richard [3 ]
机构
[1] Rhein Westfal TH Aachen, Sch Business & Econ, D-52056 Aachen, Germany
[2] ZEW Leibniz Ctr European Econ Res, D-68161 Mannheim, Germany
[3] London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Management, London WC2A 2AE, England
关键词
competing auctioneers; combinatorial auction; electronic marketplace; VCG mechanism; BUNDLING DECISIONS; OFFER AUCTIONS; EQUILIBRIUM; STRATEGIES; SELLERS; DESIGN;
D O I
10.1287/isre.2021.1018
中图分类号
G25 [图书馆学、图书馆事业]; G35 [情报学、情报工作];
学科分类号
1205 ; 120501 ;
摘要
We investigate whether revenue-maximizing auctioneers selling heterogeneous items will allow for combinatorial bidding in the presence of auctioneer competition. We compare the choice of auction format by two competing auctioneers with that of a single auctioneer. Bidders are heterogeneous in their demands, with some having synergies for items. We find that, even if a single auctioneer offers a combinatorial auction, competing auctioneers in a comparable setting will not. Instead, the competing auctioneers will segment the market by restricting allowable package bids in order to increase competition between bidders. This shows that itmight not be advantageous for an onlinemarket platform to offer combinatorial auctions as a design option to competing auctioneers.
引用
收藏
页码:1123 / 1137
页数:8
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] On Learning Repeated Combinatorial Auctions
    Arai, Seiichi
    Miura, Takao
    2011 IEEE PACIFIC RIM CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS AND SIGNAL PROCESSING (PACRIM), 2011, : 244 - 249
  • [42] Statistical mechanics of combinatorial auctions
    Galla, Tobias
    Leone, Michele
    Marsili, Matteo
    Sellitto, Mauro
    Weigt, Martin
    Zecchina, Riccardo
    PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS, 2006, 97 (12)
  • [43] Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions
    Rastegari, Baharak
    Condon, Anne
    Leyton-Brown, Kevin
    ACM SIGECOM EXCHANGES, 2007, 7 (01)
  • [44] Iterative dutch combinatorial auctions
    Biswas, S
    Narahari, Y
    ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 2005, 44 (03) : 185 - 205
  • [45] COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS AND DUALITY THEORY
    Majovska, Renata
    Fiala, Petr
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN ECONOMICS: MULTIPLE CRITERIA DECISION MAKING XIX, 2018, : 223 - 229
  • [46] Combinatorial Auctions without Money
    Fotakis, Dimitris
    Krysta, Piotr
    Ventre, Carmine
    AAMAS'14: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2014 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS & MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS, 2014, : 1029 - 1036
  • [47] Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect
    Babaioff, Moshe
    Dobzinski, Shahar
    Oren, Sigal
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2022, 136 : 255 - 273
  • [48] Combinatorial Auctions Test Suite
    Kalevova, Jana
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS 2008, 2008, : 245 - 248
  • [49] Competing auctions: Finite markets and convergence
    Virag, Gabor
    THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 2010, 5 (02) : 241 - 274
  • [50] Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions
    Schneider, Stefan
    Shabalin, Pasha
    Bichler, Martin
    AUCTIONS, MARKET MECHANISMS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS, 2009, 14 : 1 - 2