Goals and values: How is moral action possible?

An analysis is undertaken of basic inadequacies of Aristotelian and Kantian ethics with a view to achieving a synthesis of them. It is contended that the view, common to both, that ethics is a continuation of the theory of knowledge must be abandoned. Aristotle's insistence that human activity is purposeful and expedient led to a useful exploration of the relationship of means to ends and ultimately to the notion of the supreme or highest good. But to the extent to which the supreme good is defined as complete happiness, it is unattainable. Kant's revolution in ethics, which identifies morality with value, ultimately made the good will so absolute as to deprive his practical reason of practical sting, a problem that he only resolved by reverting to metaphysics, the ethical metaphysics of his postulates. Post-Kantian ethics went in two diverse directions, the first a thorough rejection of the idea of universally recognizable morals, as in Nietzsche and Marx, the other a further ontologizing of values, as in some of the neo-Kantians and axiologists. Ultimately, a morality of positive actions cannot succeed, since it cannot meet the criterion of universality; whereas morality as a material indicator of those negative actions which are never to be committed remains a viable and important exercise. The latter course would eventually lead, though its elaboration is beyond the scope of this paper, to an ethic of non-violence: "Tolstoy" as the synthetic sum of the most viable aspects of Aristotle and Kant.