If management has high private benefits and a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies against takeover threats. Two forces are at play. First, managers can transform employees into a "shark repellent" through long-term labor contracts and thereby reduce the firm's attractiveness to raiders. Second, employees can act as "white squires" for the incumbent managers. To protect their high wages, they resist hostile takeovers by refusing to sell their shares to the raider or by lobbying against the takeover. The model predicts that wages are inversely correlated with the managerial equity stake, and decline after takeovers.
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School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Glamorgan Building, Cardiff CF10 3WT, King Edward VII AvenueSchool of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Glamorgan Building, Cardiff CF10 3WT, King Edward VII Avenue
Levi M.
Dorn N.
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School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Glamorgan Building, Cardiff CF10 3WT, King Edward VII AvenueSchool of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Glamorgan Building, Cardiff CF10 3WT, King Edward VII Avenue
机构:
Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Australian Natl Univ, Canberra, ACT, AustraliaChinese Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Fan, Joseph P. H.
Huang, Jun
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Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R ChinaChinese Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Huang, Jun
Oberholzer-Gee, Felix
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Harvard Sch Business, Boston, MA USAChinese Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Oberholzer-Gee, Felix
Zhao, Mengxin
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US Secur & Exchange Commiss, Washington, DC 20549 USAChinese Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China