Fundamental human rights and (re)conciliation between law and morality in a perspective post positivist

In contemporary constitutionalism or neoconstitutionalism, principles host, normatively, the main community values and moral and political choices. Fundamental rights are often erected in the form of normative principles, which in turn, are included in the current Constitutional Texts. Dworkin's most extensive understanding on what is the law, in an interpretative perspective, is not explained nor is understood under the vision of legal positivism. It is not insignificant to remember that one of the methodological assumptions on which the entire positivist doctrine is founded (and there are all kinds of positivisms) is the separation between law and morals. Thus, understanding the normative principles, with its potential recurrence to fundamental values and political choices, fulfills this separation, especially when these principles are stated in a constitution that is in the center of importance and significance of the whole legal system, radiating its constitutional principles in the task of understanding and interpreting the legal system and consequently, giving the law a whole new content. Therefore, in the longer perspective of law, re-signified by the neoconstitutionalism, a constitution that does not harbor fundamental human rights, in the form of normative principles and with emancipatory characteristic, can not be recognized as a true constitution. This is what is intended to reflect and demonstrate in this article, with the use of literature in authorized authors on the subject.