Country of Origin Labeling (COOL): How cool is it?

被引:3
|
作者
Dinopoulos, Elias [1 ]
Livanis, Grigorios [2 ]
West, Carol [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Florida, Dept Econ, Warrington Coll Business, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA
[2] Northeastern Univ, Coll Business Adm, Informat Operat & Anal Group, Boston, MA USA
关键词
Country-of-origin labeling; Protection; Product safety; Welfare; Insurance markets; OPTIMAL EXPORT POLICY; PRODUCT-SAFETY; MARKET; QUALITY; RULES; LIABILITY; LEMONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.iref.2009.12.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper develops a partial-equilibrium model of a small open-economy trading an unsafe product. The model is used to analyze the welfare effects of trade with and without a country-of-origin labeling (COOL) program. The welfare gains from trade in the absence of COOL are ambiguous, may justify the imposition of a trade ban. Even if a full ban does not improve welfare and some restriction of trade is always welfare-enhancing. Under a tariff regime, more COOL trade is better than less trade. Independently of domestic market power, free trade coupled with a COOL program maximizes national welfare. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:575 / 589
页数:15
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