A complicated notion of equilibrium for conflict problems

被引：0
|
作者：
Smol'yakov, E. R. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Moscow MV Lomonosov State Univ, Fac Computat Math & Cybernet, Moscow 119991, Russia
来源：
DOKLADY MATHEMATICS | 2015年 / 92卷 / 01期
基金：
俄罗斯基础研究基金会;
关键词：
DOKLADY Mathematic; Game Problem; Strong Equilibrium; Conflict Problem; Auxiliary Game;
D O I：
10.1134/S1064562415040092
中图分类号：
O1 [数学];
学科分类号：
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要：
A new equilibrium for conflict problems is proposed, which has very cumbersome definition but, in return, is very useful both from the point of view of finding unique solutions of game problems and in those cases where known equilibria important for seeking a solution turn out to be empty.
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页码：424 / 427
页数：4
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