A complicated notion of equilibrium for conflict problems
被引:0
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作者:
Smol'yakov, E. R.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Moscow MV Lomonosov State Univ, Fac Computat Math & Cybernet, Moscow 119991, RussiaMoscow MV Lomonosov State Univ, Fac Computat Math & Cybernet, Moscow 119991, Russia
Smol'yakov, E. R.
[1
]
机构:
[1] Moscow MV Lomonosov State Univ, Fac Computat Math & Cybernet, Moscow 119991, Russia
DOKLADY Mathematic;
Game Problem;
Strong Equilibrium;
Conflict Problem;
Auxiliary Game;
D O I:
10.1134/S1064562415040092
中图分类号:
O1 [数学];
学科分类号:
0701 ;
070101 ;
摘要:
A new equilibrium for conflict problems is proposed, which has very cumbersome definition but, in return, is very useful both from the point of view of finding unique solutions of game problems and in those cases where known equilibria important for seeking a solution turn out to be empty.
机构:
Moscow MV Lomonosov State Univ, Fac Computat Math & Cybernet, Moscow 119991, RussiaMoscow MV Lomonosov State Univ, Fac Computat Math & Cybernet, Moscow 119991, Russia
机构:
Univ Santiago de Compostela, Dept Estadist & Invest Operat, Santiago De Compostela, SpainUniv Santiago de Compostela, Dept Estadist & Invest Operat, Santiago De Compostela, Spain
Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio
Melendez-Jimenez, Miguel A.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Malaga, Dept Teoria & Hist Econ, Malaga 29013, SpainUniv Santiago de Compostela, Dept Estadist & Invest Operat, Santiago De Compostela, Spain