Incentivizing Organ Donor Registrations with Organ Allocation Priority

被引:28
|
作者
Stoler, Avraham [1 ,2 ]
Kessler, Judd B. [3 ]
Ashkenazi, Tamar [4 ]
Roth, Alvin E. [5 ]
Lavee, Jacob [6 ,7 ]
机构
[1] Depaul Univ, Dept Econ, Highland Pk, IL USA
[2] Coherent Econ, Highland Pk, IL USA
[3] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[4] Israeli Natl Transplant Ctr, Tel Aviv, Israel
[5] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[6] Tel Aviv Univ, Fac Med, Ramat Gan, Israel
[7] Tel Aviv Univ, Heart Transplantat Unit, Sheba Med Ctr, Ramat Gan, Israel
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
organ transplantation; organ donation; organ allocation; incentive for organ donation; transplant law; MULTIHOSPITAL KIDNEY EXCHANGE; PRESUMED CONSENT; TRANSPLANTATION LAW; OPT-OUT; DONATION; ISRAEL; CHAINS; CHALLENGES; MARKETS; NATIONS;
D O I
10.1002/hec.3328
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
How donor organs are allocated for transplant can affect their scarcity. In 2008, Israel's Parliament passed an Organ Transplantation Law granting priority on organ donor waiting lists to individuals who had previously registered as organ donors. Beginning in November 2010, public awareness campaigns advertised the priority policy to the public. Since April 2012, priority has been added to the routine medical criteria in organ allocation decisions. We evaluate the introduction of priority for registered organ donors using Israeli data on organ donor registration from 1992 to 2013. We find that registrations increased when information about the priority law was made widely available. We find an even larger increase in registration rates in the 2months leading up to a program deadline, after which priority would only be granted with a 3-year delay. We also find that the registration rate responds positively to public awareness campaigns, to the ease of registration (i.e. allowing for registering online and by phone) and to an election drive that included placing registration opportunities in central voting locations. Copyright (c) 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:500 / 510
页数:11
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