Detecting False Data Injection Attacks Against Power System State Estimation With Fast Go-Decomposition Approach

被引:86
|
作者
Li, Boda [1 ,2 ]
Ding, Tao [1 ,2 ]
Huang, Can [3 ]
Zhao, Junbo [4 ]
Yang, Yongheng [5 ]
Chen, Ying [2 ]
机构
[1] Xi An Jiao Tong Univ, Dept Elect Engn, State Key Lab Elect Insulat & Power Equipment, Xian 710049, Shaanxi, Peoples R China
[2] Tsinghua Univ, Dept Elect Engn, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
[3] Lawrence Livermore Natl Lab, Livermore, CA 94550 USA
[4] Virginia Polytech Inst & State Univ, Bradley Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Falls Church, VA 22043 USA
[5] Aalborg Univ, Dept Energy Technol, DK-9220 Aalborg, Denmark
基金
中国国家自然科学基金; 中国博士后科学基金;
关键词
Cyber security; false data injection attacks (FDIA); matrix separation; smart grid; state estimation (SE); LOW-RANK; DEFENSE;
D O I
10.1109/TII.2018.2875529
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
State estimation is a fundamental function in modern energy management system, but its results may be vulnerable to false data injection attacks (FDIAs). FDIA is able to change the estimation results without being detected by the traditional bad data detection algorithms. In this paper, we propose an accurate and computational attractive approach for FDIA detection. We first rely on the low rank characteristic of the measurement matrix and the sparsity of the attack matrix to reformulate the FDIA detection as a matrix separation problem. Then, four algorithms that solve this problem are presented and compared, including the traditional augmented Lagrange multipliers (ALMs), double-noise-dual-problem (DNDP) ALM, the low rank matrix factorization, and the proposed new "Go Decomposition (GoDec)." Numerical simulation results show that our GoDec algorithm outperforms the other three alternatives and demonstrates a much higher computational efficiency. Furthermore, GoDec is shown to be able to handle measurement noise and applicable for large-scale attacks.
引用
收藏
页码:2892 / 2904
页数:13
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