Strategic foundations of general equilibrium: Dynamic matching and bargaining games.

被引:0
|
作者
McLennan, A [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:163 / 165
页数:3
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] Bargaining, reputation, and equilibrium selection in repeated games with contracts
    Abreu, Dilip
    Pearce, David
    ECONOMETRICA, 2007, 75 (03) : 653 - 710
  • [42] Dynamic system of strategic games
    Gordji, Madjid Eshaghi
    Askari, Gholamreza
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NONLINEAR ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS, 2018, 9 (01): : 83 - 98
  • [43] STRATEGIC DELAY AND ENDOGENOUS OFFERS IN BARGAINING GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION
    NICKERSON, D
    SADANAND, A
    SADANAND, V
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE, 1994, 60 (02): : 125 - 154
  • [44] Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games with suspended realizations of threats
    Cao, Zhigang
    SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2013, 41 (02) : 337 - 358
  • [45] Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games with suspended realizations of threats
    Zhigang Cao
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 41 : 337 - 358
  • [46] Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games
    Bich, Philippe
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2019, 183 : 786 - 822
  • [47] Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
    Frankel, DM
    Morris, S
    Pauzner, A
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2003, 108 (01) : 1 - 44
  • [48] A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MACRO MODEL WITH WAGE BARGAINING
    JACOBSEN, HJ
    SCHULTZ, C
    SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1990, 92 (03): : 379 - 398
  • [49] Convergence to Equilibrium of Logit Dynamics for Strategic Games
    Vincenzo Auletta
    Diodato Ferraioli
    Francesco Pasquale
    Paolo Penna
    Giuseppe Persiano
    Algorithmica, 2016, 76 : 110 - 142
  • [50] A tight characterization of strategic games with a unique equilibrium
    Ganchev, Antoniy
    Narayanan, Lata
    Shende, Sunil
    THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE, 2013, 481 : 37 - 50