Internal managerial promotions: Insider incentives and CEO succession

被引：31
|
作者：
Mobbs, Shawn [1 ]
Raheja, Charu G. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Alabama, Culverhouse Coll Commerce & Business Adm, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 USA
[2] Wake Forest Univ, Babcock Grad Sch Management, Winston Salem, NC 27106 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2012年 / 18卷 / 05期
关键词：
CEO succession; Organization structure; Tournament; Compensation; Firm performance; RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS; INTERACTION TERMS; FIRM; COMPENSATION; TURNOVER; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTORS; DETERMINANTS; PERFORMANCE; BOARDS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.09.001
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We identify and compare firms that promote a single executive (successor-incentive) and companies that conduct tournaments (tournament-incentive) among inside managers to succeed the CEO. Successor-incentive firms give more pay-for-performance compensation to the designated successor, are more likely in firms or industries where firm-specific human capital is more important to the CEO position and where the supply of potential outside CEO replacements is limited. In addition, these firms are associated with lower CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance. Restricting firms that are suited for a successor-incentive promotion to a tournament-incentive promotion is associated with lower firm valuation. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：1337 / 1353
页数：17
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