The effects of uncertainty about countries' compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact

被引:7
|
作者
Ferre, Montserrat [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Rovira & Virgili, Reus 43204, Spain
[2] CREIP, Dept Econ, Reus 43204, Spain
关键词
Fiscal policy rules; Monetary union; Stability and Growth Pact; Uncertainty; Commitment; INTEREST-RATE VOLATILITY; FISCAL-POLICY; MONETARY UNION; MONEY GROWTH; DEFICIT; OUTPUT; RULES; EURO;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpolmod.2011.12.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was established to govern discretionary fiscal policy in the European Monetary Union. This article studies the effects created when there is uncertainty about the members' commitment to respecting the established deficit limits in the SGP. We will show that, even if countries respect the SGP deficit ceiling, the presence of uncertainty about their compliance will bring about higher volatility in key economic variables, which could, in turn, affect unemployment and growth negatively. This finding shows that it is important to reduce uncertainty about the members' commitment towards the SGP. (c) 2012 Society for Policy Modeling. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:660 / 674
页数:15
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