A characterization of the single-crossing domain

被引：47
|
作者：
Bredereck, Robert [1 ]
Chen, Jiehua [1 ]
Woeginger, Gerhard J. [2 ]
机构：
[1] TU Berlin, Inst Fuer Softwaretech & Theoret Informat, Berlin, Germany
[2] TU Eindhoven, Dept Math & Comp Sci, Eindhoven, Netherlands
来源：
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2013年 / 41卷 / 04期
关键词：
INTERMEDIATE PREFERENCES; STRATEGY-PROOFNESS; MAJORITY-RULE; ORDER; SETS;
D O I：
10.1007/s00355-012-0717-8
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of which contains three voters and six (not necessarily distinct) alternatives, and one of which contains four voters and four (not necessarily distinct) alternatives. We also provide an efficient way to decide whether a preference profile is single-crossing.
引用
收藏
页码：989 / 998
页数：10
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