The discretionary effect of CEOs and board chairs on corporate governance structures

被引：5
|
作者：
Arena, Matteo P. [1 ]
Braga-Alves, Marcus V. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Marquette Univ, Coll Business Adm, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE | 2013年 / 21卷
关键词：
Corporate governance; Board of directors; Manager fixed effects; Sarbanes-Oxley Act; COMPENSATION; DETERMINANTS; SIZE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jempfin.2013.01.002
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
In this study we analyze the effect of latent managerial characteristics on corporate governance. We find that CEO and board chair fixed effects explain a significant portion of the variation in board size, board independence, and CEO-chair duality even after controlling for several firm characteristics and firm fixed effects. The effect of CEOs on corporate governance practices is attributable mainly to executives who simultaneously hold the position of CEO and board chair in the same firm. Our results do not show a decline in CEO discretionary influence on corporate governance after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and stock exchange governance regulations. (c) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：121 / 131
页数：11
相关论文
共 50 条
12345