EVALUATING THE PROSPECT OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT IN LIGHT OF EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE

The theory of experimentalist governance ('EG') emerged to show how stakeholders facing uncertainty may solve a complex governance problem and how they can jointly explore feasible ways to advance their goals in a learning -by -doing process. Given that climate change is characterised by strategic uncertainty and polyarchic distribution of power, EG is claimed to be a potentially attractive model to respond to the multidimensional nature of climate change in comparison to more traditional forms of governance. The Paris Agreement brought a new governance structure into the climate change regime by introducing a 'pledge and review' model based on nationally determined contributions as opposed to the traditional legally binding, targets- and-timetables approach adopted by the Kyoto Protocol. Against this backdrop, the aim of this article is to assess the explanatory accuracy and evaluative utility of EG theory when applied to the Paris Agreement. This article ends by evaluating the prospect of the Paris Agreement in light of EG and highlighting the key areas of concern indicated by this theory.