Reply to "Comment on 'Bit-string oblivious transfer based on quantum state computational distinguishability' "

In the Comment the author states that the proposed all-or-nothing oblivious transfer (OT) protocol in our paper is insecure against a dishonest Alice and, as a corollary, derives an attack to Crepeau's construction of 1-out-of-2 OT. The security criterion used in the Comment is indeed stronger than the one used in our paper. However, we argue that the criterion used in our paper is in the spirit of the original idea of the OT protocol proposed by Rabin. Moreover, a protocol that satisfies the criterion in our paper can be used to construct useful multiparty protocols. Finally, the protocol in our paper can be used, together with a secure bit commitment scheme, to construct a 1-out-of-2 OT secure against malicious Alice, achieving the security requirement considered in the Comment.