optimal bank closure rules;
Poisson-distributed audits;
excessive risks;
underlying assets;
D O I:
10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00045-8
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
We consider a model of optimal bank closure rules (cum capital replenishment by banks), with Poisson-distributed audits of the bank's asset value by the regulator, with the goal of eliminating (ameliorating) the incentives of levered bank shareholders/managers to take excessive risks in their choice of underlying assets. The roles of (tax or other) subsidies on deposit interest payments by the bank, and of the auditing frequency are examined. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Int Monetary Fund, European Dept, Washington, DC 20431 USAInt Monetary Fund, European Dept, Washington, DC 20431 USA
Aiyar, Shekhar
Calomiris, Charles W.
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机构:
Columbia Business Sch, Financial Inst, New York, NY USA
Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAInt Monetary Fund, European Dept, Washington, DC 20431 USA
Calomiris, Charles W.
Wieladek, Tomasz
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h-index: 0
机构:
Bank England, Res Hub, Res Interact Monetary & Macroprudential Policy, London, EnglandInt Monetary Fund, European Dept, Washington, DC 20431 USA
机构:
Graduate School of Economics, Osaka City University, 3-3-138 Sugimoto, Sumiyoshi-ku, 558-8585, OsakaGraduate School of Economics, Osaka City University, 3-3-138 Sugimoto, Sumiyoshi-ku, 558-8585, Osaka